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Abstract
We present a revealed preference methodology for analyzing intertem-
poral household consumption behavior. In doing so, we follow a collec-
tive approach, which explicitly recognizes that multi-member house-
holds consist of multiple decision makers with their own rational pref-
erences. Following original work of Mazzocco (2007), we develop tests
that can empirically verify whether observed consumption behavior is
consistent with (varying degrees of) intrahousehold commitment. In
￿We thank seminar participants in Glasgow, Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve. In addition,
we are grateful to Thomas Demuynck for useful suggestions.
yCentER, Tilburg University, and Center for Economic Studies, University of Leu-
ven. E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium. E-mail: laurens.cherchye@kuleuven-
kortrijk.be. Laurens Cherchye gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the Research
Fund K.U.Leuven through the grant STRT1/08/004.
zECARES-ECORE, UniversitØ Libre de Bruxelles. Avenue F. D. Roosevelt 50, CP
114, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: bderock@ulb.ac.be. Bram De Rock gratefully
acknowledges the European Research Council (ERC) for his Starting Grant.
xCenter for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk,
Belgium. E-mail: Jeroen.Sabbe@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Jeroen Sabbe gratefully acknowl-
edges the Fund for Scienti￿c Research - Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) for ￿nancial support.
{Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kor-
trijk, Belgium. E-mail: Ewout.Verriest@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Ewout Verriest gratefully
acknowledges the Fund for Scienti￿c Research - Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) for ￿nancial
support.
1our set-up, commitment means that households choose consumption
allocations on the ex ante Pareto frontier. The distinguishing feature
of our tests is that they are entirely nonparametric, i.e. their imple-
mentation does not require an a priori (typically non-veri￿able) spec-
i￿cation of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individual utili-
ties). We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our methodology by
means of an empirical application. For the data at hand, our results
suggest using a so-called limited commitment model that allows for
household-speci￿c commitment patterns. Importantly, our applica-
tion also shows that bringing intertemporal dynamics in the empirical
analysis can substantially increases the discriminatory power of the
revealed preference methodology.
JEL Classi￿cation: D11, D12, D13, C14.
Keywords: collective models of household consumption, intertempo-
ral consumption, commitment, revealed preferences.
1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that a realistic modeling of household con-
sumption behavior must take into account preference heterogeneity within
the household: in many cases, the household decision-making process cannot
be explained by the restrictive unitary framework, which models the house-
hold as if it were a single decision maker.1 In addition, many household
decisions are inherently intertemporal. For example, such intertemporal in-
terdependence typically applies to decisions on family savings, investment
in human capital, housing purchase, fertility decisions, etc. This directly
extends to a consumption setting. In many cases, consumption today im-
pacts on consumption tomorrow and vice versa (e.g. because of (dis)saving
possibilities).
This paper presents a revealed preference methodology for analyzing in-
tertemporal consumption decisions of multi-person households. Speci￿cally,
we develop a methodology for revealed preference analysis in terms of the
intertemporal ￿ collective￿framework set out by Mazzocco (2007). In this in-
troductory section, we will brie￿ y recapture Mazzocco￿ s main ideas and point
1Many studies reject the empirical validity of the unitary model for multi-person house-
hold behavior. See, for example, Lundberg (1988), Thomas (1990), Fortin and Lacroix
(1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), Du￿ o
(2003) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008).
2out our own methodological contribution. In addition, we will indicate an
important empirical motivation for our following analysis. Speci￿cally, as we
will demonstrate, bringing intertemporal dynamics in the empirical analysis
can substantially enhance the ￿ discriminatory power￿of the revealed prefer-
ence methodology. In our opinion, this is a most interesting observation, as
low power is a frequently cited concern for static (or atemporal) revealed
preference analysis.
Intertemporal consumption and commitment. Mazzocco (2007)
introduced a household consumption model that simultaneously accounts for
the non-unitary and intertemporal nature of household consumption deci-
sions. He adopts a collective approach, which means that he explicitly recog-
nizes that a multi-person household consists of multiple members (decision
makers) with their own preferences. Mazzocco￿ s model considers the observed
household consumption behavior as the result of a within-household bargain-
ing process between these members. It (only) assumes that this process yields
a Pareto e¢ cient within-household allocation.2 The household￿ s location on
the Pareto frontier is then de￿ned by the distribution of the within-household
bargaining power over the individual household members; and this power dis-
tribution may vary depending on the speci￿c situation at hand. In particular,
shifts in the bargaining power can be induced by changes of so-called distrib-
ution factors (which in￿ uence the bargaining power distribution but not the
household members￿preferences). In Mazzocco￿ s original model these dis-
tribution factors are explicitly taken up in the intertemporal decision model
(which will constitute an important di⁄erence with the approach we follow in
this paper; see below). In his analysis, Mazzocco adopts the life cycle model
for describing intertemporal consumption decisions; and, thus, he obtains
a collective extension of the widely applied unitary life cycle consumption
model.3
More speci￿cally, Mazzocco develops empirical tests for two versions of
his intertemporal collective consumption model: a ￿ full commitment￿model
and a ￿ no commitment￿model. In the full commitment model, household con-
2Chiappori (1988, 1992) originally suggested this collective approach for analyzing a
household￿ s labor supply behavior (in a static setting); see also Apps and Rees (1988) for
a similar analysis. Browning and Chiappori (1998) extended Chiappori￿ s original analysis
to apply to the more general setting of household consumption behavior (again in a static
setting); see also Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009) for closely related contributions.
3See, for example, Browning and Crossley (2001) for an extensive overview of the
literature on the unitary life cycle model.
3sumption allocations are assumed to be situated on the ex ante Pareto fron-
tier: household members commit themselves not to respond to unexpected
shocks of the variables a⁄ecting the bargaining power. In the no commitment
model, the ex ante Pareto frontier is replaced by the ex post Pareto frontier:
household allocations no longer satisfy the stated commitment criterion but
they still meet Pareto e¢ ciency. More precisely, it is assumed that, if some
unexpected shock makes an individual participation constraint binding, the
household members renegotiate to decide on the intrahousehold allocations.
We will brie￿ y recapture Mazzocco￿ s full and no commitment models in Sec-
tion 2, where we will also indicate how these models relate to the di⁄erent
models (with varying commitment) considered in the present study.
Revealed preference analysis. In Sections 3 and 4, we will consider
the revealed preference analysis of models characterized by varying degrees
of commitment. This will extend Mazzocco￿ s analysis in two ways. Firstly,
we present a revealed preference characterization (and corresponding tests)
of intertemporal collective consumption behavior. In the tradition of Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982),4 we derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
household consumption data to be consistent with a particular behavioral
model. These conditions then enable checking consistency of a given data set
with the model; in the spirit of Varian (1982), we refer to this as ￿ testing￿data
consistency with the model under study.5 Attractively, our revealed prefer-
ence approach enables a full nonparametric veri￿cation of these conditions,
i.e. the associated tests do not require an a priori (typically non-veri￿able)
parametric speci￿cation of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individ-
ual preferences). This contrasts with the tests that were originally proposed
by Mazzocco (2007), which do require such a parametric speci￿cation in
practice.6
4See also Samuelson (1948), Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contri-
butions on the revealed preference approach to analyzing consumption behavior.
5As is standard in the revealed preference literature, the type of tests that we consider
here are ￿ sharp￿tests; either a data set satis￿es the data consistency conditions or it does
not.
6In particular, Mazzocco originally developed a so-called ￿ di⁄erential￿characterization
of intertemporal consumption behavior in a collective framework. The speci￿c feature of
this di⁄erential approach is that it focuses on properties of a function representing house-
hold consumption behavior (e.g. cost, indirect utility and demand functions). Practical
applications of this approach typically require a prior parametric speci￿cation of the func-
tion subject to study. By contrast, the revealed preference approach that we follow here
(only) uses a ￿nite set of household consumption observations.
4Our second extension pertains to the modeling of commitment. In con-
trast to Mazzocco￿ s original work, we no longer need that deviations from
commitment are modeled explicitly in terms of (observed) distribution fac-
tors. As we will argue in Section 2, the requirement that all relevant dis-
tribution factors are e⁄ectively observed is quite demanding. To account
for this, our revealed preference tests solely use information on the house-
hold￿ s observed consumption quantities and the corresponding prices. As
such, their practical implementation does not need any explicit information
on distribution factors.
Three preliminary remarks are in order with respect to our following
revealed preference analysis. Firstly, this analysis is directly related to ear-
lier work of Browning (1989) and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007,
2011). Browning provided a revealed preference characterization of the uni-
tary life cycle model.7 We extend this characterization to a collective setting.
Next, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen established the revealed preference
characterization of the static collective consumption model. We add to this
work by accounting for intertemporal relations between household consump-
tion decisions.
Secondly, we will follow Browning (1989) by assuming perfect capital mar-
kets and perfect foresight with regard to all relevant economic variables, and
by using intertemporally separable utility functions to represent the individ-
ual preferences. Admittedly, these are very strong assumptions. However, as
pointed out by Browning (in casu in a unitary context), the ￿ ip side of the
coin is that our method allows for testing the collective model of intertem-
poral behavior without requiring an ad hoc functional speci￿cation or error
process. Thus, if we can accept our strong assumptions for some given data
set, then any test of weaker assumptions on the same data can be interpreted
as a test of the functional form that is adopted rather than the behavioral
assumptions as such.
Finally, our following analysis will concentrate on the characterization
of intertemporal consumption models, and testing consistency of observed
behavior with alternative model speci￿cations. If observed behavior is con-
sistent with a particular model, then a natural next question pertains to
7Crawford (2010) provides another, more recent contribution on revealed preference
analysis of the unitary life cycle model. Speci￿cally, he extended Browning￿ s original
characterization by accounting for habit formation in the household consumption. We
see the integration of Crawford￿ s analysis with the analysis developed in this paper as an
interesting avenue for future research.
5recovering/identifying the decision model that underlies the observed con-
sumption behavior (e.g. individual preferences). To focus our discussion,
such recovery will not be studied here. However, it is worth emphasizing
that our revealed preference characterizations do allow for subsequent re-
covery analysis. For example, Varian (1982) and, more recently, Blundell,
Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) considered such recovery (based on re-
vealed preferences) for the unitary consumption model, and Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2011) studied similar recovery issues for the static col-
lective model. The analyses of these authors can be extended to the current
setting when starting from the revealed preference characterizations estab-
lished below.
Empirical performance: goodness-of-￿t versus power. In Sec-
tion 5, we will demonstrate the practical usefulness of our revealed prefer-
ence methodology by an empirical application to panel data drawn from the
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). A main conclusion will
be that adding intertemporal dynamics to the collective model substantially
increases the discriminatory power of the revealed preference analysis. This
is an important point to make, as lack of power is often mentioned as an
important weakness of revealed preference tests. Bronars (1987) and, more
recently, Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) and Beatty and Crawford (2011)
-rather convincingly- argue the need to complement the basic revealed pref-
erence test results (indicating pass or fail of the data for some behavioral
model) with measures of discriminatory power if one wants a fair empirical
assessment of the model under evaluation.8 Indeed, favorable test results
(i.e. a high pass rate for some given data), which prima facie suggest a good
empirical ￿t of the model under study, have little value if the test has little
discriminatory power (i.e. the model is hard to reject for the data at hand).
This argument pro conducting power assessments in addition to goodness-
of-￿t evaluations is particularly valid in the context of revealed preference
analysis of collective consumption models. The few existing empirical stud-
ies that make use of revealed preference methods to test the static collective
model suggest a need for information on assignable goods (i.e. goods for
8In fact, Beatty and Crawford (2010) also propose a measure for the ￿ predictive￿success
of a model, which is computed by combining power and pass rates for the corresponding
revealed preference tests. For compactness, we will not explicitly use this predictive success
measure in our empirical analysis in Section 5. But, in principle, the measure can easily
be computed from the results that are reported.
6which the consumption of individual household members is known) to ob-
tain reasonable power results; see, for example, Cherchye, De Rock and Ver-
meulen (2009, 2011). To some extent, this is problematic as such assignable
information is often not available in household budget surveys.9 In our em-
pirical application, we will show that an intertemporal collective model does
have powerful empirical restrictions even if no assignable quantity informa-
tion is used. We then evaluate alternative intertemporal collective consump-
tion models (with varying commitment) by simultaneously considering their
goodness-of-￿t and power. Our ￿ndings suggest that a model with ￿ limited￿
commitment (i.e. situated between full and no commitment) provides the
best description of the particular data at hand.
The concluding Section 6 summarizes our main ￿ndings and suggests
some avenues for further research. Appendix A contains the proofs of our
theoretical results.
2 Intertemporal collective consumption
We consider a household with M members. The household has to decide
over the consumption of a bundle of N private goods and a bundle of K
public goods. Given that there is private and public consumption in the
household, the utility of each member m is given by the function um(qm;Q),
with qm 2 RN
+ the private consumption bundle of m and Q 2 RK
+ the public
consumption bundle.10 Throughout, we will assume that each utility function
um is continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in its arguments.
The empirical analysis of household consumption starts from a time series
of consumption choices. Let T = f1;:::;jTjg represent such a time series,
which pertains to a given number of periods jTj. We thus have a set of




t ) and Qt represent the chosen household bundles of private
and public goods; we use pt 2 RN
++ for the discounted price vector of the
9However, data sets with detailed assignable information are increasingly available in
the literature. See, for example, Browning and Głrtz (2006) and Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2010).
10We will abstract from externalities associated with privately consumed quantities.
Importantly, however, our setting can actually account for such externalities. Speci￿cally,
if an individual is the exclusive consumer of a particular private good, then we can account
for externalities for this good by formally treating it as a public good.
7private commodities and Pt 2 RK
++ for the discounted price vector of the
public commodities. Note that we make the standard assumption that we
only observe qt and not the intrahousehold allocation qm
t ; i.e. we assume the
individual consumption of private goods is not observed and, thus, no goods
are assignable to individual household members. In what follows, we will use
yt (= p0
tqt+P0
tQt) for the household￿ s income at period t and Y (=
PjTj
t=1 yt)
for the household￿ s total income.
2.1 Intertemporal collective model
As indicated in the Introduction, we adopt a life cycle approach for mod-
eling intertemporal collective consumption behavior. Speci￿cally, we make
the same basic assumptions as Browning (1989) used for his revealed pref-
erence analysis of intertemporal consumption behavior in a unitary setting:
we assume household members have perfect foresight, face perfect capital
markets, and are endowed with preferences that can be represented by an
intertemporally (additively) separable utility function. Next, following Maz-
zocco (2007), for each member m we assume exponential utility discounting
on the basis of a time-invariant discount factor ￿
m 2]0;1]. Given all this,
a notable di⁄erence between our set-up and the one of Mazzocco is that we
assume perfect foresight. We will return to this di⁄erence below.
A speci￿c feature of the collective model is that it assumes Pareto optimal
intrahousehold allocations. Formally, using intertemporal separability, this































In our life cycle approach, we simultaneously consider all periods t in
T and account for the household￿ s total income Y . The intertemporal in-
trahousehold allocation must then satisfy the following condition: for each
period t there exist weights ￿m







































In Mazzocco￿ s (2007) model of intertemporal collective consumption behav-
ior, commitment is the key notion. To introduce this concept in our present
set-up, we partition the set T (representing the full period) in ￿ mutually
exclusive subsets T￿ (representing sub-periods). More formally, we consider
partitions T of the following form:
T =fT1;:::T￿g (with T =
[￿
￿=1 T￿ and T￿1 \ T￿2 = ; if ￿1 6= ￿1) such that
￿1 < ￿2 implies t1 < t2 for all t1 2 T￿1 and t2 2 T￿2:
Using this notation, we assume commitment over each subset T￿. This
means that the bargaining weights ￿m are held constant over all periods t
included in the subset (or sub-period) T￿. For a given partition T, commit-
ment then requires the following restriction for the intrahousehold allocation:




t = qt) for each period t and
bargaining weights ￿m




































In the collective model, the concept of commitment is intrinsically re-
lated to so-called distribution factors, which in￿ uence the bargaining weights
(represented by ￿m) but not the member￿ s preferences (represented by um).
These factors include, for example, exogenous income of individual house-
9hold members, sex ratio within the relevant region, the country￿ s divorce
legislation, etc. (see, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and
Lechene (1994) and Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) for more
discussion). By assuming commitment for a subset of periods T￿, we keep
the bargaining weight constant for all periods t in T￿. The interpretation
is that household members commit themselves to de￿ning their bargaining
weights for consumption decisions in T￿ (only) on the basis of distribution
factors that realize in this sub-period.
In this respect, it is worth to point out that Mazzocco (2007) distin-
guishes between a ￿ full commitment￿model and a ￿ no commitment￿model.
We will adopt a similar distinction below. In doing so, we must account
for the fact that Mazzocco did not assume perfect foresight, while we do use
perfect foresight as a maintained hypothesis. In Mazzocco￿ s full commitment
model, household members account for all expected shocks over the full pe-
riod, and commitment then means that household members cannot respond
to unexpected shocks in the distribution factors. In our set-up (with perfect
foresight), this model complies with a ￿xed bargaining weight over all peri-
ods t in T (or T = fTg and ￿ = 1). Next, in Mazzocco￿ s no commitment
model, the members can renegotiate the decisions after an unexpected shock
in the distribution factors but only if some participation constraint becomes
binding. This complies with the general version of our limited commitment
model (with ￿ ￿ 1) as it is presented above. Below, we will introduce a
di⁄erent ￿ no commitment￿model as a limiting case of this general model.
At this point, we want to stress that our revealed preference characteri-
zations will make no explicit use of distribution factors. Our motivation is
both empirical and theoretical. From an empirical point of view, this mini-
mizes the data requirement: we no longer need to observe these distribution
factors, and it is well known that useful distribution factors are often hard to
￿nd in empirical studies. From a theoretical point of view, abstracting from
distribution factors implies that we do not explicitly model how a partition
T is obtained. Our following revealed preference characterization will allow
us to verify whether or not some given partition T obtains consistency with
the intertemporal collective model. (Interestingly, as we will illustrate in our
empirical application, our characterization will also allow us to endogenously
de￿ne a partition T consistent with the model.) An attractive by-product is
that this allows the bargaining power to depend not only on observed distri-
bution factors (such as the ones listed above) but also on distribution factors
that are typically not observed (such as love, health status, ...).
10To end this section, we introduce two limiting cases of the general lim-
ited commitment model, i.e. a full commitment model and a no commitment
model (which is actually a limiting case of Mazzocco￿ s no commitment model
mentioned above). These cases will be useful to structure our following dis-
cussion. As discussed before, full commitment means that the bargaining
weight is constant over the full period, which obtains T = fTg and ￿ = 1.
Formally, this means that there exist bargaining weights ￿m such that for each
period t the household consumes private quantities qm


































By contrast, in our no commitment model the bargaining weights can
change in each di⁄erent decision period t, which corresponds to T = ff1g;
:::; fjTjgg and ￿ = jTj. In this case, there exist bargaining weights ￿m
t such
that in each period t the household chooses private quantities qm
t and public

































3 Revealed preference characterization
This section develops the revealed preference characterization of our in-
tertemporal collective model with limited commitment. This characterization
implies testable conditions for data consistency with the model while avoid-
ing an a priori (typically parametric) speci￿cation of the utility functions um
and the bargaining weights ￿m. In our analysis below, we consider the dis-
count factors ￿
m and the partition T as given. In our empirical application
11in Section 5, we will consider several scenarios for the partition T, which
basically imply alternative speci￿cations of the general limited commitment
model. In this empirical exercise, we will also consider a number of di⁄erent
values for ￿
m, so to identify the values that best ￿t the data at hand.11
Before introducing the revealed preference characterization of the in-
tertemporal collective model, we ￿rst de￿ne the basic optimality criterion
for an intertemporal intrahousehold allocation in our set-up. Following the
arguments of Bewley (1977) and Hall (1978), the life-cycle hypothesis im-
plies that an optimal allocation smooths the marginal utility of income in
every time period. The following Strong Rational Expectations Hypothesis
(SREH) de￿nes this criterion for our speci￿c setting (using (x)z for the z-th
entry of a vector x).
De￿nition 1 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿
m. Suppose further that each member m is endowed with a utility
function um, and that each subset T￿ is associated with bargaining weights
￿m
￿ .
Then, the Strong Rational Expectations Hypothesis (SREH) is satis￿ed if, for


























t ;Qt)) = ￿￿(Pt)k
for all private goods n 2 f1;:::;Ng and public goods k 2 f1;:::;Kg.
Clearly, direct veri￿cation of SREH requires a speci￿cation of the utility
functions um and the bargaining weights ￿m. As indicated above, the re-
vealed preference approach that we follow here avoids such a speci￿cation.
Essentially, it de￿nes conditions that must be satis￿ed such that there ex-
ists a possible speci￿cation of the functions um and weights ￿m that obtains
consistency with SREH. These conditions will be given in the following The-
orem 1. Before stating this theorem, we ￿rst de￿ne the concept of limited
commitment (LC) rationalizability.
11Crawford (2010) followed a similar approach to deal with utility discounting in his
revealed preference analysis of unitary intertemporal consumption behavior.
12De￿nition 2 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿
m. The set S is LC-rationalizable if there exist utility functions um,
bargaining weights ￿m













We can now formulate the characterization of LC-rationalizable consump-
tion behavior. Below, we will explain the relation between this characteriza-
tion and the SREH condition in De￿nition 1.
Theorem 1 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿
m. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The set S is LC-rationalizable:







t 2 R++ such that the




































The interpretation of conditions (a), (b) and (c) in statement (ii) is as fol-
lows. First, the prices Pm
t in condition (a) express the marginal willingness to
pay of each member m for the publicly consumed quantities Qt. They can be
interpreted as Lindahl prices since they must add up to the observed prices.
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2011) use a similar concept of Lin-
dahl prices for the public goods in their revealed preference characterization
of the static collective consumption model. Next, condition (b) follows from
the fact that we do not observe the intrahousehold allocation of the private
goods. As such, we need that there exists at least one feasible allocation.
Finally, condition (c) states so-called Afriat inequalities (after Varian, 1982;
based on Afriat, 1967) for our intertemporal collective model with limited
commitment. These inequalities provide an explicit construction of the util-
ity levels (um
t ) associated with each member m and observation t for the
given data set S. Condition (c) introduces SREH in our characterization of
the limited commitment model (see in particular the variables ￿
m
￿ that apply
to each subset T￿). In the next section, we will provide further intuition for
these Afriat inequalities.
134 Practical tests
Statement (ii) in Theorem 1 implies conditions for data consistency with the
limited commitment model that do not require a prior speci￿cation of the
utility functions um and the bargaining weights ￿m. This is attractive from a
conceptual point of view, as such a speci￿cation is typically nonveri￿able in
practical applications. However, from an empirical point of view, the char-
acterization in Theorem 1 is of limited use. The reason is that condition




s , which makes it
di¢ cult to verify this condition for a given data set. In this section, we will
consider reformulations of the conditions in Theorem 1 that do have practi-
cal usefulness because they no longer involve nonlinearities. Speci￿cally, we
￿rst consider the two limiting cases that we also discussed before, i.e. the
full commitment model and the no commitment model. Subsequently, we in-
troduce linear conditions for the general version of the limited commitment
model.
4.1 Full commitment
In the full commitment model the bargaining weights ￿m are constant over
all decision periods (i.e T = fTg and ￿ = 1). Building on Theorem 1, we
obtain the following characterization.
Proposition 1 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿
m. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The set S is FC-rationalizable:





t 2 R++ such that the following

































The main di⁄erence with the characterization in Theorem 1 pertains to
condition (c) in statement (ii). Under full commitment, this condition no
longer involves a speci￿cation of ￿
m
￿ . The underlying argument is that, un-
der full commitment, SREH implies that each member￿ s marginal utility of
14income must be constant over all time periods t 2 T. In terms of condition
(c) in Theorem 1, this implies a single value ￿
m for each member m. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 1, we can then drop ￿
m altogether in the
Afriat inequalities, so to obtain condition (c) in Proposition 1.
The characterization in statement (ii) of Proposition 1 is particularly at-
tractive from a computational point of view. For a given speci￿cation of ￿
m,




t . Thus, a practical test of the full commitment model can
use standard linear programming techniques to verify the inequalities.
As a ￿nal remark, we indicate that the revealed preference characteriza-
tion in Proposition 1 is formally close to Browning￿ s (1989) revealed prefer-
ence characterization of rational intertemporal behavior in a unitary context.
In fact, Browning also provided an equivalent characterization in terms of
so-called cyclical monotonicity conditions. It is easy to verify that the char-
acterization in statement (ii) of Proposition 1 can equally be expressed in
terms of such cyclical monotonicity conditions; in this case, we will get such
a condition for each m. Interestingly, these cyclical monotonicity conditions
will also imply a set of linear inequalities, which can thus be checked through
linear programming. However, the veri￿cation of these conditions is compu-
tationally more complex than checking the Afriat inequalities in Proposition
1. Basically, for a given data set the number of cyclical monotonicity in-
equalities will generally be (often substantially) higher than the number of
Afriat inequalities. Therefore, we choose to focus on the Afriat inequalities
in this paper.
4.2 No commitment
In the no commitment model the bargaining weights can be di⁄erent in each
decision period (i.e T = ff1g; :::; fjTjgg and ￿ = jTj). We now get the
following characterization.
Proposition 2 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿
m. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The set S is NC-rationalizable:
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As compared to the characterization in Theorem 1, the Afriat inequalities
in Proposition 2 no longer include discount factors. The reason is that we
now have a di⁄erent value for ￿
m
t associated with each observation t. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 2, these (observation speci￿c) variables ￿
m
t
also incorporate the (observation speci￿c) discount factors.
In fact, statement (ii) of Proposition 2 implies a characterization for the
no commitment model that is formally equivalent to the one obtained by
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) for the static collective model. As
such, we conclude that the static collective model and the no commitment
model are empirically indistinguishable. This may seem paradoxical at ￿rst
sight, because the structural decision problems that underlie the two models
are intrinsically di⁄erent. The explanation is that SREH has no testable
implications if the bargaining weights can alter in each di⁄erent period, which
is the case under no commitment. Indeed, given that the empirical researcher
cannot observe the bargaining weights, (s)he cannot conclude for the data
at hand whether the observed consumption patterns are either explained by
consumption smoothing or changing bargaining weights.
Finally, as for empirical veri￿cation, we note that the Afriat inequalities





Interestingly, however, in their analysis of the (empirically equivalent) sta-
tic collective model, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) have shown
that the conditions in statement (ii) of Proposition 2 can equivalently be
formulated as mixed integer programming (MIP) constraints, which can be
checked through standard MIP techniques. Given this, we conclude that the
nonlinear Afriat inequalities in Proposition 2 can equivalently be expressed
in MIP terms. In turn, this implies a practical test for data consistency with
the no commitment model.
164.3 Limited commitment
For the general case of limited commitment, verifying the revealed preference
conditions in Theorem 1 implies solving a system of nonlinear inequalities;
and this system cannot be reformulated in MIP terms. To see this last
point, we note that the Afriat inequalities contain multiple values of ￿
m
￿ ,
and each value ￿
m
￿ simultaneously applies to a subset of observations (i.e.
all observations t 2 T￿). This has two implications. Firstly, the fact that
the Afriat inequalities contain multiple ￿
m
￿ makes that we cannot just drop
these variables as in the full commitment case. Secondly, because each ￿
m
￿
simultaneously applies to di⁄erent observations, it is impossible to apply
the insights of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) to equivalently
reformulate the Afriat inequalities in MIP terms.
All this makes verifying the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in The-
orem 1 a di¢ cult matter. Therefore, in our empirical application we will
focus on linear conditions that are necessary (but not su¢ cient) for data
consistency with the limited commitment model. These conditions no longer
account for the fact that the Afriat inequalities pertaining to di⁄erent sub-
sets of observations T￿ are interrelated. More precisely, we solve the Afriat
inequalities for each subset separately: for each t 2 T￿ we (only) consider the
Afriat inequalities pertaining to other observations s that belong to the same
subset T￿ (rather than to all other observations s 2 f1;:::;Tg). As such, our
necessary condition essentially requires that observed household behavior is
consistent with the full commitment model (and the associated SREH con-
dition) only for each separate subset of observations T￿. In fact, in contrast
to the necessary and su¢ cient condition in Theorem 1, this necessary condi-
tion allows the individual utility functions (um) to be di⁄erent in each other
sub-period.12
Proposition 3 Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount
factors ￿






t 2 R++ such that the following conditions hold for all
12In a unitary setting, Browning (1989) followed a closely similar reasoning when intro-
ducing his so-called SREH-2 model.


































In this section we present an empirical application of the practical tests dis-
cussed above. As discussed in the Introduction, we will evaluate the empirical
performance of alternative speci￿cations of the intertemporal collective model
in terms of both goodness-of-￿t and discriminatory power. This application
complements the earlier study of Mazzocco (2007) by providing revealed pref-
erence tests of intertemporal collective models (with varying commitment).
It also complements empirical studies that focused on revealed preference
tests of the static collective model; see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2009, 2011). We start by discussing the data. Next, we consider some
methodological extensions of the basic tests presented in the previous sec-
tion, which will be useful for our empirical analysis. Finally, we present our
empirical results.
5.1 Data
We use data drawn fromthe Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
The RLMS is an extensive panel data set containing detailed consumption
expenditure data of various categories of commodities for a large sample of
households. For each household, we have consumption data for eight years
(i.e. the years 1994 until 2003 except from 1997 and 1999). We focus on
couples without children (i.e. M = 2), so as to homogenize the sample.
Furthermore, in order to abate the concern of non-separability between con-
sumption and leisure (see, for example, Browning and Meghir (1991)), we
only select couples with both members employed. In the end, this obtains
a sample with 148 couples, each observed for eight periods. Cherchye, De
Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2008) and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2009, 2011) provided revealed preference analyses of the same sample in
18terms of the static collective consumption model; these authors also provide
additional details on the data.
The commodity bundle under consideration consists of 21 nondurables:
(1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel, (4) wood fuel, (5)
gas fuel, (6) luxury goods, (7) services, (8) housing rent, (9) bread, (10)
potatoes, (11) vegetables, (12) fruit, (13) meat, (14) dairy products, (15) fat,
(16) sugar, (17) eggs, (18) ￿sh, (19) other food items, (20) alcohol and (21)
tobacco. Throughout, we will assume that wood fuel, gas fuel and housing
rent represent public consumption (i.e. K = 3), while all other goods are
assumed to be private (i.e. N = 18). For all goods, we have discounted
the real prices (pt;Pt) by using compound real interest rates in Russia as
obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
For the given selection of publicly and privately consumed goods, we will
evaluate intertemporal collective models at the level of the individual house-
holds. This implies that each household￿ s quantity and price observations
form a separate set S with T = f1; :::; 8g. The fact that we test the models
for each household separately avoids possibly controversial preference homo-
geneity assumptions across di⁄erent households.
As a ￿nal remark, we recall from the Introduction that our following
analysis will not make use of information on assignable goods. The reason
is that the RLMS does not directly provide this information. Interestingly,
our application will demonstrate that the intertemporal collective consump-
tion model can have strong empirical restrictions even in the absence of such
assignable information. We believe this is an interesting empirical result for,
as we also indicated in the Introduction, existing revealed preference analy-
ses of the static collective model typically needed assignable information to
obtain powerful tests. See, for example, the above mentioned studies that
analyzed the same RLMS data in terms of the static collective consump-
tion model; these studies imputed assignable information (based on observed
expenditures for singles in the RLMS) to obtain reasonable power results.
5.2 Methodological extensions
As indicated before, an important focus in our following analysis will be on
the evaluation of the discriminatory power of the di⁄erent models subject to
evaluation. Next, our empirical analysis will also account for optimization
error, i.e. behavior might (slightly) violate the exact rationalizability condi-
tions de￿ned above. We here brie￿ y present the corresponding methodolog-
19ical extensions of the tests presented in Section 4.
Power measurement. For a given data set, power quanti￿es the prob-
ability of detecting (simulated) behavior that is not consistent with the be-
havioral model subject to testing; we will refer to such inconsistent behavior
as ￿ random￿behavior. Given the general importance of power for the type
of revealed preference tests that we consider here, we will measure power in
two di⁄erent ways. The di⁄erence between the two power measures (which
we label Power-1 and Power-2) pertains to the procedure that is used for
simulating random behavior. As we will explain, each measure captures a
di⁄erent aspect of the discriminatory power of revealed preference tests.
Our Power-1 measure uses a notion of randomness that is based on
Becker￿ s (1962) de￿nition of irrational behavior, which states that house-
holds randomly choose consumption bundles that exhaust the available bud-
get. Bronars (1987) was the ￿rst one to use this notion in the context of
evaluating the power of revealed preference tests (in casu in a unitary set-
ting). Speci￿cally, the Power-1 measure is constructed in two steps. In the
￿rst step, we construct household-speci￿c power measures, as follows. For
each household, we simulate 1000 random series of eight consumption choices
by constructing, for each of the eight observed household budgets, a random
quantity bundle exhausting the given budget (for the corresponding prices);
we construct these random quantity bundles by drawing budget shares for the
21 goods from a uniform distribution. The household-speci￿c power measure
is then calculated as one minus the proportion of the randomly generated
consumption series that are consistent with the model under evaluation. In
the second step, the aggregate Power-1 is measure is de￿ned as the sample
average of these household-speci￿c power measures. This Power-1 measure is
independent of the observed quantities and, thus, it quanti￿es discriminatory
power as it directly follows from the given prices and budgets.
Next, our Power-2 measure uses a bootstrap procedure to simulate ran-
dom behavior, and is based on a proposal of Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006).
Speci￿cally, instead of using the uniform distribution, we now draw from
the empirical distribution to simulate random behavior: we de￿ne random
quantity bundles by drawing budget shares (for the 21 goods) from the set
of 1184 (= 148 x 8) observed household choices in the original data set.
The motivation for using this alternative randomization procedure is that
it incorporates more information on the actual choices made by households,
while preserving a notion of randomness. For the given randomization, we
20calculate the Power-2 measure by using a similar two-step procedure as for
our Power-1 measure.
We consider our Power-2 measure in addition to our Power-1 measure
as a robustness check. More precisely, in practice it may well be that some
data are associated with a high Power-1 measure but a low Power-2 measure
because of speci￿c consumption patterns revealed by the quantity data. For
example, it can be veri￿ed that the Power-2 measure will always be zero if
only one good is e⁄ectively consumed by the households in the sample at
hand (for example, because this is the only good that is deemed ￿ desirable￿
by these households). In such a case, the Power-1 measure will be arti￿cially
high because, by its very construction, it assigns possitive quantities to all
goods (including the goods that are never consumed in practice).
Optimization error. The tests de￿ned in Section 4 are ￿ sharp￿tests:
they only tell us whether households are exact optimizers in terms of the
behavioral model that is under evaluation. This is a demanding premise,
especially in our intertemporal setting. In fact, one may argue that exact
optimization is not a very interesting hypothesis, but that we rather want to
know whether the behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way
to describe observed behavior. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we will
also consider extended versions of the basic (sharp) tests that account for
optimization error; these extended tests focus on nearly optimizing behavior
rather than exactly optimizing behavior. See also Varian (1990) for a general
discussion on the usefulness of considering such nearly optimizing behavior
in empirical revealed preference analysis.
To deal with optimization error, we adapt an original proposal of Afriat
(1973) for revealed preference tests in a unitary setting. Speci￿cally, opti-
mization error is captured by some ￿ Afriat index￿e 2 [0;1]; to obtain the
extended tests, we replace (p0
tqm
t + (Pm
t )0Qt) by e ￿ (p0
tqm
t + (Pm
t )0Qt) in the
Afriat inequalities in Propositions 1-3 (see condition (c) in each statement
(ii)). Clearly, if the Afriat index e = 1:00, then the extended tests coincide
with the original sharp tests, while lower values for e account for optimiza-
tion error. In our empirical exercise, we allow for small optimization error
by considering e = 0:95 and e = 0:90. For every behavioral model subject to
study, we will evaluate goodness-of-￿t and power for each value of e that we
consider.
215.3 Results
One remark is in order before presenting our empirical results. As indicated
above, we need to specify the discount factors ￿
m (in casu for m = 1; 2)
prior to the actual testing exercise. To facilitate our further exposition, we
only present test results for a limited number of possible speci￿cations of
￿1 and ￿2. Speci￿cally, we will report results for scenarios corresponding
to ￿1 and/or ￿2 equal to 0:80, 0:90 and 1:00.13 Importantly, this includes
several scenarios in which household members have a di⁄erent time preference
(i.e. ￿1 6= ￿2). In this respect, we note that the identity of the individual
household members (1 and 2) is irrelevant in our following analysis because
we do not use assignable quantity information.
Table 1 gives pass rates and Tables 2a and 2b present power results (for
Power-1 and Power-2, respectively) for the di⁄erent intertemporal collective
models that we consider. To structure our following discussion, we will ￿rst
consider the test results for the extreme cases of our general limited com-
mitment model, i.e. the full commitment model (FC, with T = fTg and
￿ = 1) and the no commitment model (NC, with T = ff1g; :::; fjTjgg and
￿ = jTj). Subsequently, we will analyze four alternative model speci￿cations
that account for limited commitment in the household (LC-1 to LC-4, with
1 < ￿ < jTj).
Full commitment and no commitment. Let us ￿rst evaluate the full
commitment (FC) model. We start by considering the ￿ sharp￿tests, which
-to recall- correspond to Afriat index e = 1:00. From Tables 1, 2a and 2b, we
learn that exactly the same results apply to any combination of ￿1 and ￿2
that we consider: pass rates are everywhere 0% and power measures always
amount to (approximately) 100%.
These results indicate that the sharp tests are overly demanding for the
full commitment model. Therefore, we next consider Afriat index e = 0:95
and e = 0:90, which accounts for some (but not much) optimization error.
The overall picture remains the same as before: pass rates are everywhere
(close to) 0% and power measures are always (nearly) 100%.
All this suggests that the full commitment model is strongly rejected for
the data at hand. This is visualized in Figure 1, which gives pass rates for our
di⁄erent versions of the full commitment model as a function of optimization
13Test results corresponding to other values of ￿1 and ￿2 are available from the authors
upon request.
22error (captured by the Afriat index e). Consistent with the results in Table
1, we only obtain reasonable pass rates when we allow for an implausible
degree of optimization error.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding power results. For compactness, we
only consider Power-1; results for Power-2 are qualitatively similar. Expect-
edly, power decreases rather rapidly with optimization error. When simul-
taneously considering pass rates and power result, we do not ￿nd strong
empirical support for any value of e: reasonably high pass rates are generally
associated with very low power and vice versa.
Figure 1: Full Commitment pass rate for varying optimization error
23Figure 2: Full commitment Power-1 for varying optimization error
Given these negative results for the full commitment model, we next turn
to the other limiting model, i.e. the no commitment (NC) model. As indi-
cated in Section 4, the values of the discount factors ￿1 and ￿2 are irrelevant
for the model tests in this case. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Tables
1, 2a and 2b report the same pass rates and power results for every di⁄er-
ent combination of ￿1 and ￿2. In general, we now get exactly the opposite
picture to what we found before: pass rates are everywhere 100% and power
measures are always 0%.
Overall, we can conclude that neither the full commitment model nor
the no commitment model is well supported by the data: the ￿rst model
implies too stringent rationalizability conditions, while the conditions for
the second model have too little discriminatory power. At a more general
level, our results indicate the following relation between, on the one hand,
the degree of intrahousehold commitment in the intertemporal consumption
model and, on the other hand, the apparent trade-o⁄ between goodness-￿t
and power results for the corresponding revealed preference tests: including
24commitment restrictions in the model contributes to the power of the tests;
however, too stringent commitment assumptions has an adverse e⁄ect on the
pass rates for the model. In our opinion, this pleads for limited commitment
models, which are situated between the extreme full and no commitment
models.
Limited commitment. We evaluate four limited commitment mod-
els situated between the full and no commitment models. For each model
speci￿cation, we use the practical test based on the necessary condition for
LC-rationalizability in Proposition 3. We begin by considering three speci￿-
cations that use an a priori speci￿ed partition T that is common to each of
the 148 households in our sample. By using a common partition, these speci-
￿cations implicitly assume the same commitment ￿ breaks￿for each household.
Using our terminology of Section 2, such a commitment break then corre-
sponds to a change in the bargaining weights (due to changing distribution
factors) between the corresponding sub-periods.
Subsequently, we also evaluate a fourth speci￿cation that allows the par-
tition T to vary depending on the speci￿c household at hand. In this ex-
ercise, each household-speci￿c partition is (endogenously) de￿ned such that
it rationalizes the household behavior in terms of the corresponding LC-
rationalizability test. In particular, for each household we select the partition
that corresponds to the smallest number of commitment breaks. Contrary
to the ￿rst three speci￿cations, this speci￿cation accounts for the possibility
that commitment breaks are idiosyncratic at the household level. Essentially,
this means that we allow for distribution factors (causing these breaks) to
be particular to individual households, which e⁄ectively does seem to be a
plausible prior. In fact, by accounting for inter-household heterogeneity, this
fourth model speci￿cation better exploits the panel structure of our data set.
We refer to our three model speci￿cations with common commitment
breaks as the LC-1, LC-2 and LC-3 models. The respective partitions are:
LC-1 : T =fT1 = f1;2g;T2 = f3;4g;T3 = f5;6g;T4 = f7;8gg;
LC-2 : T =fT1 = f1g;T2 = f2;3g;T3 = f4;5g;T4 = f6;7g;T5 = f8gg,
LC-3 : T =fT1 = f1;2;3;4g;T2 = f5;6;7;8gg.
The interpretation is as follows. Firstly, our LC-1 and LC-2 models implicitly
assume that bargaining weights only depend on the distribution factors of
two consecutive periods, which implies subsets containing (at most) 2 years.
25The two models di⁄er from each other in terms of their starting year (i.e.
year 1 for the LC-1 model and year 2 for the LC-2 model). Our motivation
for including these two models is that, in his revealed preference analysis of
the unitary life cycle model, Browning (1989) used a closely similar SREH-
2 model; in a certain sense, our LC-1 and LC-2 models extend Browning￿ s
intuition for his SREH-2 model to the collective setting we study. Next, our
LC-3 model is inspired on a recent ￿nding of Lacroix and Radtchenko (2011)
for the RLMS data set that we study: these authors found empirical evidence
that several important distribution factors shifted around the period of the
￿nancial crisis in Russia, which appeared in 1998. Because 1998 coincides
with the fourth observation in our time series data, this e⁄ectively suggests
the partition given above.
Like before, Tables 1, 2a and 2b present the empirical performance results
for the three models under consideration. As for the pass rates, we ￿nd
that especially the models LC-1 and LC-2 substantially outperform the full
commitment model. For example, for an Afriat index e = 0:90 we get a pass
rate above 30% for the LC-1 model and above 40% for the LC-2 model (each
time for ￿1 = 0:80 and ￿2 = 1:00). However, pass rates are still fairly low
in general. This is all the more true for the LC-3 model, for which the pass
rates nowhere exceed 13%.
On the other hand, we observe that both our Power-1 and Power-2 mea-
sures are quite high for any values of ￿1 and ￿2. As we can expect a priori,
lower values of the Afriat index e generally imply lower power; but even for
e = 0:90 our power measures are everywhere (and often substantially) above
50%. In general, we get the same trade-o⁄ as before: models that are asso-
ciated with high pass rates typically have low discriminatory power and vice
versa. Overall, the partitions underlying our LC-1, LC-2 and LC-3 models
seem to be only weakly supported by the data. We may conclude that the
assumption of common commitment breaks for all households is too strong
for our sample.
This weak evidence pro common commitment breaks motivates consid-
ering our fourth limited commitment model, which -to recall- accounts for
household-speci￿c commitment breaks. We refer to this model as the LC-4
model. Speci￿cally, we endogenously de￿ne household-speci￿c partitions T
as follows: for each household, the full period T is subdivided in continuous
sub-periods that each separately satisfy the condition for FC-rationalizability
in Proposition 1. By the very construction of these (household-speci￿c)
partitions T, each household will pass the corresponding condition for LC-
26rationalizability in Proposition 3. As such, we get by construction a pass
rate of 100% for our LC-4 model (for any value of the Afriat index e). As
an illustration, Figure B.1 in Appendix B gives an overview of the obtained
partitions used for rationalizing the data in terms of our LC-4 model.14
Let us then focus on the discriminatory power of the LC-4 model. In this
case, power is de￿ned as the probability that (simulated) random behavior
fails the condition in Proposition 3 when using the endogenously de￿ned
partitions as described above (and illustrated in Figure B.1). From Tables
2a and 2b we ￿nd that, even though the Power-1 and Power-2 values are
substantially below the ones for the full commitment model and the LC-1 to
LC-3 models, the LC-4 model turns out to be considerably more powerful
than the no commitment model. Overall, power does not seem to vary too
much for the di⁄erent values of ￿1 and ￿2 that we study. The ￿ most powerful￿
combination of ￿1 and ￿2 generally depends on the value of e and the speci￿c
power measure (Power-1 or Power-2) under consideration.
As an additional exercise, Figure 3 presents power result for the LC-4
model as a function of optimization error (measured by e). The ￿gure has a
similar interpretation as Figure 2; for brevity, we again only consider Power-
1. The ￿gure con￿rms that the model has reasonable power for values of the
Afriat index e that are generally considered plausible (e.g. above 0:90).
As a general conclusion, we can argue that our LC-4 model strikes a rather
good balance between goodness-of-￿t and discriminatory power: it combines
a 100% pass rate with reasonable power results (for e su¢ ciently high). In
turn, this leads us to conclude that the limited commitment model with
household-speci￿c commitment breaks provides a rather good description of
the intertemporal consumption behavior under study.
In our opinion, an interesting following step can relate these ￿ndings on
household-dependent commitment breaks to observable distribution factors,
to investigate which household (member) characteristics and/or other exoge-
nous variables e⁄ectively drive the commitment breaks. Such an exercise
falls beyond the scope of the current study (also because of limited data
availability). But our empirical analysis does indicate that the revealed pref-
erence tests presented in this paper can be useful for addressing this type of
questions.
14The ￿gure refers to the scenario with ￿1 = 0:80, ￿2 = 1:00 and e = 0:95. Similar
￿gures for alternative values of ￿1, ￿2 and e are available upon request.
27Figure 3: LC-4 Power-1 for varying optimization error
28Table 1: Collective commitment models - Pass rate
(% of households passing the test)
FC NC LC-1 LC-2 LC-3 LC-4
Afriat index e = 1:00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 0.00 100.00 6.08 10.81 0.00 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 0.00 100.00 8.78 16.89 0.68 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 10.14 22.30 0.68 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 0.00 100.00 6.08 8.78 0.00 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 8.78 16.89 0.68 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 6.76 8.78 0.00 100.00
Afriat index e = 0:95
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 0.00 100.00 10.14 18.92 0.68 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 0.00 100.00 14.19 25.00 3.78 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 21.62 31.76 6.76 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 0.00 100.00 12.84 20.95 2.03 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 16.89 27.03 4.73 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 0.00 100.00 15.54 19.59 4.05 100.00
Afriat index e = 0:90
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 0.00 100.00 18.92 29.73 4.73 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 0.68 100.00 24.32 35.14 8.11 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 0.68 100.00 33.78 43.92 12.16 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 0.00 100.00 19.59 32.43 5.41 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 0.68 100.00 31.08 40.54 9.46 100.00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 0.68 100.00 29.73 35.81 9.46 100.00
29Table 2a: Estimated statistical power (%) - Power-1
Power - Bronars FC NC LC-1 LC-2 LC-3 LC-4
Afriat index e = 1:00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 100.00 0.00 92.20 88.75 99.81 25.54
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 90.33 83.60 99.43 21.38
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 100.00 0.00 86.68 78.12 98.49 20.03
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 91.90 89.66 99.73 28.83
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 100.00 0.00 88.88 84.23 99.13 25.09
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 100.00 0.00 91.48 89.96 99.68 23.93
Afriat index e = 0:95
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 100.00 0.00 87.28 79.49 98.31 16.77
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 82.42 73.19 96.48 15.74
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 99.67 0.00 73.88 66.33 93.71 16.59
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 84.67 78.37 97.41 21.58
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 99.82 0.00 77.26 70.91 94.92 17.92
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 99.95 0.00 80.65 78.00 96.42 21.37
Afriat index e = 0:90
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 99.97 0.00 78.04 69.49 95.11 13.04
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 99.42 0.00 70.40 63.58 92.26 13.36
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 98.17 0.00 57.33 57.87 86.37 16.55
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 99.63 0.00 73.36 66.79 93.48 13.85
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 98.33 0.00 60.21 60.31 87.64 17.90
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 98.62 0.00 63.95 64.95 89.76 20.07
30Table 2b: Estimated statistical power (%) - Power-2
Power - Bootstrap FC NC LC-1 LC-2 LC-3 LC-4
Afriat index e = 1:00
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 100.00 0.00 92.70 89.04 99.87 27.22
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 90.48 81.76 99.42 20.74
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 99.99 0.00 85.41 75.46 98.24 19.07
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 92.61 89.44 99.80 31.97
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 100.00 0.00 89.03 82.44 99.13 26.05
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 100.00 0.00 92.45 90.35 99.76 27.49
Afriat index e = 0:95
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 100.00 0.00 88.50 80.69 98.76 19.39
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 99.98 0.00 82.42 72.40 96.53 16.76
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 99.67 0.00 74.06 65.65 93.61 17.61
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 100.00 0.00 86.28 78.46 97.86 23.91
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 99.81 0.00 78.20 70.29 95.16 19.55
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 99.97 0.00 82.74 78.96 96.91 25.36
Afriat index e = 0:90
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:80) 99.95 0.00 79.11 69.53 95.31 15.49
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 0:90) 99.53 0.00 71.42 63.17 92.50 15.10
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:80 ; 1:00) 98.75 0.00 59.03 57.03 87.22 17.04
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 0:90) 99.79 0.00 75.16 66.60 94.02 15.75
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (0:90 ; 1:00) 98.90 0.00 62.25 59.77 88.88 18.34
(￿1 ; ￿2) = (1:00 ; 1:00) 99.19 0.00 66.75 64.85 91.60 22.48
6 Summary and conclusions
We have presented a methodology for revealed preference analysis of in-
tertemporal collective consumption behavior. Following Mazzocco (2007),
we have de￿ned tests that allow for empirically verifying consistency of ob-
served behavior with intertemporal consumption models characterized by
varying degrees of commitment. The particular feature of these tests is that
they are entirely nonparametric, which means that their practical applica-
tion does not require an a priori (typically nonveri￿able) speci￿cation of the
individual utilities and the intrahousehold bargaining process. An empirical
application to RLMS data has demonstrated the practical usefulness of the
methodology. Speci￿cally, we have evaluated alternative behavioral models
(with varying commitment) in terms of their goodness-of-￿t as well as their
31discriminatory power. This application provided empirical evidence pro using
a limited commitment model that allows for household-speci￿c commitment
patterns. Importantly, our results also show that accounting for intertem-
poral relations between household consumption decisions may substantially
increase the power of the revealed preference analysis.
We see multiple avenues for future research. Firstly, we have adopted a
basic life cycle model for describing intertemporal consumption; as we have
indicated, this follows Browning￿ s (1989) original work on revealed prefer-
ence analysis in a unitary setting. A more realistic modeling of intertem-
poral household consumption behavior may weaken the strong underlying
assumptions, i.e. perfect capital markets, perfect foresight and intertempo-
rally separable utility functions. This can obtain consumption models that
achieve an even better empirical performance (in terms of goodness-of-￿t and
power) than the models we considered in this paper. In this respect, follow-up
research may fruitfully build on recent methodological advances for revealed
preference analysis of unitary consumption behavior. For example, relaxing
the assumption of perfect capital markets can use the insights of Demuynck
and Verriest (2010). Similarly, intertemporal separability may be weakened
by integrating Crawford￿ s (2010) characterization of intertemporal behavior
under habit formation.
Secondly, we have adopted Mazzocco￿ s (2007) original starting point that
households achieve Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold allocations, which basi-
cally means that household members interact in a ￿ cooperative￿way. We
believe it will be interesting to extend our framework to account for possi-
bly ￿ noncooperative￿behavior of individual household members and, thus, to
model household allocations as Nash equilibria rather than Pareto e¢ cient
outcomes. This may also imply a more subtle modeling of the notion of
intrahousehold commitment. In this respect, the recent study of Cherchye,
Demuynck and De Rock (2011) can serve as a useful starting point; these
authors considered revealed preference analysis of noncooperative household
consumption in a static setting.
32Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Theorem 1





, with t 2 T, for a partition T=fT1;:::T￿g. Let ￿ denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the household budget constraint. We get
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s and imposing the sum conditions on the person-
alized quantities qm
t and Lindahl prices Pm
t gives condition (ii) of Theorem
1.
(ii) ) (i): Suppose condition (ii) of Theorem 1 holds. De￿ne the following
utility function, using the appropriate ￿
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Using a straightforwardly similar argument as Varian (1982), we can derive
um(qm
t ;Qt) = um
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Consider any consumption path (xm
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Without loosing generality, we can assume that ￿￿ = 1































































































































t ;Qt) = um
t , we obtain that condition (i) of Theorem 1 is
satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 1
We have the partition T = fTg and ￿ = 1. Because this partition involves
only a single subset, there is only a single bargaining weight (￿m) that is
relevant for each member m (= 1;:::;M). Given this, we can use an analogous
argument as in our proof of Theorem 1 to show (i) ) (ii). Speci￿cally,
as compared to the proof of Theorem 1, we now de￿ne ￿
m = ￿=￿m and,
subsequently, we use um(qm
s ;Qs) = um
s =￿
m.





















The remainder of the argument is analogous as for the general limited
commitment model (see our proof of Theorem 1).
35Proof of Proposition 2
We have the partition T = ff1g;:::;fjTjgg and ￿ = jTj. This speci￿cation
of the LC-model implies time-dependent bargaining power ￿m
t (m = 1;:::;M;
t 2 T). Given this, we can use an analogous argument as in our proof of
Theorem 1 to show (i) ) (ii). Speci￿cally, as compared to the proof of










for all m = 1;:::;M, t 2 T, and we use um(qm
s ;Qs) = um
s .













s ) + P
0
s(X ￿ Qs)])
The remainder of the argument is again analogous as for the general
limited commitment model (see our proof of Theorem 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a set of observations S, a partition T and discount factors ￿
m.





+ that are feasible (i.e. sum up




t 2 R++ such that the following conditions hold for all m 2 f1;:::;Mg,

























Let us now consider these inequalities for two observations s;t that belong





￿ , we obtain the set of conditions stated in Proposition 3,
which are linear for a given discount factor ￿
m.
36Appendix B: Commitment patterns for LC-4
The ￿gure below shows that our dataset obtains 49 di⁄erent categories of
households having an identical commitment break pattern needed to pass
the conditions for LC-rationalizability in Proposition 3, when using ￿1 =
0:80, ￿2 = 1:00 and e = 0:95. A vertical bar indicates a commitment break
between the corresponding periods t and t + 1 (t = 1;:::;8). The categories
are ranked according to the number of households for which we observe the
same pattern, in descending order. For example, there are 11 households
with a partition T = fT1 = f1g;T2 = f2;3;4g;T3 = f5;6;7g;T4 = f8gg, 9
households with T = fT1 = f1;2;3;4g;T2 = f5;6;7;8gg, etc.
Figure B.1: Endogenously de￿ned commitment break patterns
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